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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920316-CA 
v. s 
LOUIS LEE MACIAL, I Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. t 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of three counts of 
distribution of, or offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, each a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), as 
the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly determine that the 
prosecution's peremptory challenge of a juror was not racially 
motivated? A party attacking a peremptory jury challenge on 
equal protection grounds must establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination; if a prima facie case is established, 
the challenged party must then provide a race-neutral explanation 
to rebut the prima facie case. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
93-94, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1721 (1986); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 
338 (Utah 1991), 
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings of 
whether purposeful discrimination has occurred must be given 
deference and will only be set aside if clearly erroneous. State 
v. Cantu fill, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991). If inadequate factual findings exist, the matter must be 
remanded to the trial court for further determination. Batson, 
476 U.S. at 100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725; State v. Cantu m , 750 P.2d 
591, 597 (Utah 1988). If purposeful discrimination in the use of 
the state's peremptory challenges is ultimately found, reversal 
of the defendant's conviction is mandated without regard to the 
harmlessness of the constitutional error. Batson, 476 U.S. at 
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725. Contra Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780; Cantu 
XXI, 750 P.2d at 597 (both incorrectly holding that a "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on November 6, 1991 with three 
counts of unlawful distribution of, or offering, agreeing, 
consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, each a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann* § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992) (Record [hereafter R.] at 
-2-
6-8). A jury trial was held February 26, 1992, in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, district judge, presiding (R. at 45-46). 
Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced on May 4, 1992 
(R. at 116-19). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal involve the 
questioning and challenge of prospective juror Bettye English (a 
copy of the pertinent transcript pages is attached as an 
addendum). As with the other venire members, Ms. English gave a 
synopsis of her background at the outset of voir dire (R. at 
152).* The court subsequently asked the panel if any of them 
"had been a party to any lawsuit, whether it's criminal or civil" 
(R. at 160). Eight people raised their hands, indicating their 
involvement; one of them was Ms. English. The first six persons 
called on stated their involvement in open court. When the court 
called on Ms. English, she asked to approach the bench. After an 
off-the-record conference with Ms. English (involving counsel), 
another prospective juror (No. 11) asked to approach. The court 
asked Ms. English and Juror No. 11 (R. at 195) to write notes 
about their involvement (R. at 160-62). 
The court then asked if anyone had family members or 
friends in law enforcement. Ms. English responded that her 
daughter worked for the FBI. When asked what her daughter did, 
*The transcript is internally paginated and also stamped with 
record page numbers; citation to the transcript will be to the 
record page numbers. 
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Ms. English responded, "Am I supposed to say it out loud?" The 
court asked if her daughter was an agent; Ms. English responded 
that she did not know (R. at 164). 
After voir dire, challenges for cause were registered, 
evidently outside of the presence of the panel. The State 
challenged Juror No. 11 and the court sustained the challenge on 
two bases (R. at 192-93). The first was that Juror No. 11 had 
been convicted of a felony which had been expunged. The court 
interpreted the jury qualification statute to disqualify a 
convicted felon even if the conviction had been expunged (R. at 
192-93). The second basis was the court's observation that Juror 
No. 11 had been arrested and convicted of an offense similar to 
the one being heard. Juror No. 11 had demonstrated obvious 
emotion about narcotics agents and his own arrest and conviction 
(R. at 193-94). 
After Juror No. 11 was excused, the court said: 
Let me just indicate this, that the note that 
Mrs. Bettye English wrote reads as follows — 
I don't want this note in the file. She 
doesn't want it in the file. If I read it 
and put it on the record, that's good enough. 
That's fine. Dated 2-26-92. Reads: "I 
Bettye English, was attempting to sue the 
Board of Education because I was terminated 
from my job through discrimination because I 
did not have EEO involved — [. ]" 
(R. at 202-203) (emphasis added). The court and counsel then 
discussed the fact that a detective who was a witness in the case 
told the prosecutor that the detective had gone to school with 
one of Ms. English's children (R. at 203-204). No challenge for 
cause was lodged against Ms. English. 
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Counsel exercised their peremptory challenges and the 
State struck Ms. English (R. at 43). Defense counsel objected to 
the striking of Ms. English, noting that she was the only black 
person on the panel and alleging that the State had stricken her 
"simply because she's a member of [a] minority race". Counsel 
noted that defendant "is Mexican-American or of Hispanic descent, 
and it's a violation of his due process under the . . . federal 
constitution [to strike Ms. English]." (R. at 215). The court 
asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for the peremptory 
challenge (R. at 215-16). The prosecutor responded: 
I felt, based on her unwillingness to 
speak before the rest of the group about a 
matter that I didn't find — I'm sure she 
felt that it was personal, naturally, but her 
note indicated she had a lawsuit against the 
school district. I didn't see it to be 
something that was so personal that it would 
be embarrassing to speak of before the group. 
Frankly, I found her, for lack of a better 
term, to be somewhat whiny. I don't think 
she would be a good juror with the other 
jurors. And that was the sole basis. It had 
nothing to do with her race or anything else. 
(R. at 216). The court found that explanation acceptable, 
stating: 
All right. You have made the record. I 
mean — well, what Mr. Behrens has said to 
me, to my mind, justifies, for reasons other 
than race, his peremptory challenge. What he 
has said here corresponded with my 
observations of Ms. English's demeanor, and 
that's why I ruled that the reasons stated by 
Mr. Behrens are not made up, they are not 
pretentious [sic] but, in fact, made sense to 
me. That is the reason he did what he did 
rather than doing it for reasons of race. 
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(R. at 216). At the conclusion of the trial, defendant renewed a 
motion for a mistrial based on the challenge to Ms. English (R. 
at 300-301). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court finding that the prosecutor's challenge of one of the 
jurors was not racially motivated was clearly erroneous. The 
trial court correctly found that the prosecutor's explanation 
showed that exercise of the peremptory challenge was neutral and 
thus not purposeful racial discrimination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
STATE'S CHALLENGE OF MS. ENGLISH WAS RACIALLY 
NEUTRAL AND THUS NOT PURPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION. 
Defendant's claim is that the trial court erred in 
finding that the prosecution's challenge of Ms. English was not 
racially motivated.2 A party attacking a peremptory jury 
2At the trial level, defendant claimed it was "a denial of his 
due process not to have any minorities on the jury" (R. at 215). 
On appeal, he claims a violation of an equal protection right 
(Brief of Appellant at 7). These are different claims requiring 
different analyses. A jury selection process which systematically 
excludes certain classes of people so that the jury pool does not 
represent a fair cross section of the community is a violation of 
due process under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-9 
(1978). A racially motivated peremptory challenge is a violation 
of the equal protection clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). 
In spite of defendant's use of different constitutional 
terminology at trial and on appeal, the State is not arguing waiver 
because counsel's use of the term "due process" at trial clearly 
was a misstatement. His argument did not involve the composition 
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challenge on equal protection grounds must establish a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination; if a prima facie case is 
established, the challenged party must then provide a race-
neutral explanation to rebut the prima facie case. Batson v. 
Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 93-94, 106 S. Ct, 1712, 1721 (1986); State 
v, Span, 819 P.2d 329, 338 (Utah 1991). 
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings of 
whether purposeful discrimination has occurred must be given 
deference and will only be set aside if clearly erroneous• State 
v. Cantu fin, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991). If inadequate factual findings exist, the matter must be 
remanded to the trial court for further determination. Batson, 
476 U.S. at 100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725; State v. Cantu m , 750 P.2d 
591, 597 (Utah 1988). If purposeful discrimination in the use of 
the state's peremptory challenges is ultimately found, reversal 
of the defendant's conviction is mandated without regard to the 
harmlessness of the constitutional error. Batson, 476 U.S. at 
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725. Contra Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780; Cantu 
11), 750 P.2d at 597 (both incorrectly holding that a "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable). 
In Harrison, this Court stated: 
a prima facie case of improper discrimination 
in the exercise of peremptory challenges is 
of the jury venire from which the jury was selected, i.e., a due 
process fair cross section argument. His argument focused, 
instead, on the prosecution's peremptory challenge; thus, the claim 
at trial involved equal protection. 
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raised by showing (1) that defendant is a 
member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that 
the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to 
remove members of defendant's race[3] from 
the jury panel; and (3) that these facts and 
other relevant circumstances raise an 
inference that the panelists were removed 
because of their race. 
805 P.2d at 774. As in Harrison, defendant has made no showing, 
other than to state for the record that Ms. English was black, 
that she was a member of a racial minority. .Id,, at 776. 
However, again as in Harrison, the State did not argue to the 
trial court that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie 
case. JEd. at 777. The issue of whether defendant made out a 
prima facie case of improper discrimination "became irrelevant 
when the prosecutor failed to contest it at trial." Jd. at 777. 
See also. United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th 
Cir. 1991) ("the first issue of whether prima facie case of 
discrimination exists becomes moot whenever the prosecutor offers 
a race-neutral explanation for his peremptory challenges and the 
trial court rules on the ultimate factual issue of whether the 
prosecutor intentionally discriminated"); United States v. 
Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) ("when the 
prosecution's explanation is of record, we will review only the 
district court's finding of discrimination vel non"). 
3The Utah Supreme Court has noted: 
Powers Tv. Ohio, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 1364 
(1991)] clearly eliminated any standing 
requirement which Batson imposed and held that 
a defendant of any race may challenge the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on 
equal protection grounds. 
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 339 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted). 
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When defendant objected to the State's use of a 
peremptory challenge to strike Ms. English, the court asked the 
State to explain it reasons (R. at 215-26). The State then 
presented its explanation which the trial court found to be race-
neutral (R. at 216-17). That finding should be accorded "great 
deference on review" because it "turns largely on credibility." 
Id. at 778. The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Cantu (in , 778 
P.2d 517 (Utah 1989), stated that 
an explanation given by a prosecutor for the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge must be 
"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being 
tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and 
(4) legitimate." 
Cantu (in, 778 P.2d at 518 (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 
265, 268 (Mo.App. 1987)). 
When asked by the court, the prosecution explained the 
peremptory challenge: 
[B]ased on her unwillingness to speak before 
the rest of the group about a matter that I 
didn't find — I'm sure she felt that it was 
personal, naturally, but her note indicated 
she had a lawsuit against the school 
district. I didn't see it to be something 
that was so personal that it would be 
embarrassing to speak of before the group. 
Frankly, I found her, for lack of a better 
term, to be somewhat whiny. I don't think 
she would be a good juror with the other 
jurors. And that was the sole basis. It had 
nothing to do with her race or anything else. 
(R. at 216) (emphasis added). The court found that explanation 
to be acceptable: 
[W]hat Mr. Behrens has said to me, to my 
mind, justifies, for reasons other than race, 
his peremptory challenge. What he has said 
here corresponded with mv observations of Ms. 
-9-
English's demeanor, and that's why I ruled 
that the reasons stated by Mr. Behrens . . . 
made sense to me. 
(R. at 216) (emphasis added). The trial court based its finding 
of no Batson violation on its own observations of the demeanor of 
the prospective juror. Since that court is in a better position 
to make those observations than an appellate court, this Court 
should defer to that finding. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 778. 
Ms. English exhibited unwillingness to speak up before 
the other jurors, which was evident in both her reluctance to 
openly state that she had attempted to sue the Board of Education 
for job discrimination (R. at 162) and her question about whether 
she should vocally tell what her daughter did for the FBI (R. at 
164). This reluctance was so noticeable that when counsel spoke 
in chambers about whether Ms. English's child had gone to school 
with one of the police witnesses, the court said, "Let's bring 
her in. With her[,] I don't want to do it out there in public. 
She has this thing about — " (R. at 203-204). 
The prosecutor's explanation, based on the obvious 
reluctance of Ms. English to speak up in front of the other 
venire members, has no connection to race; consequently, it is 
race-neutral.A It is also related to the case being tried 
*At trial, defendant did not articulate the Cantu (II) test 
for judging the prosecutor's explanation of the peremptory 
challenge. Defendant merely objected that he thought the 
challenged was solely on the basis of race. Because the different 
factors of the Cantu (II) test were not specifically raised, the 
trial court did not enter findings on each of the factors. The 
record supports implicit findings that the factors are met. 
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because it involves Ms, English's reluctance to speak up in front 
of the panel on this case. 
The third requirement stated in Cantu is that the 
explanation be "clear and reasonably specific." Cantu (II), 778 
P.2d at 518. The prosecutor did not challenge Ms. English just 
because she was "whiny," he articulated his concern that she was 
unwilling to speak out in front of the rest of the jury panel, 
and thus, "would [not] be a good juror with the other jurors." 
(R. at 216). Jurors have to communicate with each other during 
their deliberations and be willing to articulate their positions; 
Ms. English had shown herself unwilling to divulge much in front 
of the rest of the jury panel. The prosecutor was "reasonably 
specific" in giving this explanation for the challenge. 
Finally, the reason was legitimate as evidenced by the 
trial court's statement that the explanation corresponded with 
his own observations of Ms. English (R. at 216). The record also 
supports the explanation. Ms. English would not speak out about 
her involvement in litigation even though six others had already 
divulged their involvement in open court (R. at 160-66). She 
instead asked to approach the bench and then wrote a note to the 
court about her involvement (R. at 162 and 203). Next, she was 
hesitant to explain what her daughter did for the FBI, although 
others had already divulged their relationship with law 
enforcement in open court (R. at 164). Her hesitancy to speak 
out was so noticeable that the court was going to bring her into 
chambers to ask her whether her child had gone to school with one 
•11-
of the witnesses, stating that she had a "thing" about speaking 
up in open court (R. at 204). The prosecutor's explanation for 
challenging Ms. English meets the test set out in Cantu (II). 
The other factors defendant cites in arguing that the 
challenge was not race-neutral are that (1) the prosecution did 
not demonstrate that the juror had a bias which justified the 
challenge; and (2) because similarly situated jurors were treated 
differently. Defendant did not articulate these factors below so 
the court did not address them. See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("some form of specific preservation of 
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record" in 
order to allow appellate review). To the extent that defendant's 
general objection that the challenge was racially motivated 
preserved these factors for argument, they are without merit. 
The prosecution did not demonstrate that Ms. English 
had a particular bias because she was not challenged for bias. 
No one alleged that there was a "group bias" shared by Ms. 
English. This factor, quoted in Cantu (II) , is only one of 
several whose presence "'will tend to show that the state's 
reasons are . . . an impermissible pretext.'" 778 P.2d at 518 
(quoting State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988)). The 
fact that there was no allegation of either group or individual 
bias demonstrates that this factor is not relevant to this case. 
Defendant's claim that Ms. English and Juror No. 11 
were similarly situated is without basis in the record. While 
both of them handed notes to the judge to inform of their legal 
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involvement, the similarity ends there. By notef Juror No. 11 
informed the court that he had been convicted of a crime similar 
to the charges here and had strong feelings about his arrest and 
about narcotics agents (R. at 192-93). The conviction had been 
expunged which explained the secrecy Juror No. 11 displayed by 
informing the court by a note. Based on this information, the 
court granted a challenge for cause and defendant did not object 
(R. at 192-94). 
This situation is vastly different from Ms. English's. 
Her note informed the court about an attempted law suit regarding 
job discrimination which demonstrated little reason for the 
secrecy she showed (R. at 203). There also appeared to be little 
reason why she could not answer in open court when asked what her 
daughter did for the FBI; when informed she should "say it out 
loud," she said she wasn't sure what her daughter did (R. at 
164). An attempted lawsuit and an answer that she did not know 
what her daughter did for the FBI did not justify the mystery 
with which Ms. English imbued them. Juror No. 11's expunged 
felony conviction was justifiably concealed from open court. 
Juror No. 11's excusal for cause precludes any 
comparison with Ms. English's excusal on peremptory challenge. 
The reasons for and point at which they were excused show that 
they were not similarly situated. Since they were not similarly 
situated, a comparison of their excusals does not demonstrate a 
racially biased peremptory challenge. 
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In sum, defendant has failed to show that the trial 
court's finding that the challenge of Ms. English was not 
racially motivated is clearly erroneous. The prosecutor gave a 
legitimate, neutral and clear and reasonably specific explanation 
for the challenge which was related to the case. An objection to 
the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge is valid only when 
the challenge is based "solely" on the juror's race. Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
J 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this «2- day of November, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
.ENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald S. Fujino and James A. Valdez, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOC, Attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this -3- day of November, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
1 including the Ensign. We get the National Geographic, 
2 the Sky and Telescope. 
3 THE COURT: What I didn't catch, Mr. Asper, is 
4 what you do for a living. 
5 MR. ASPER: I work with the National Weather 
6 Service. I have been there 31 years. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
8 Ms. English? 
9 I MS. ENGLISH: Bettye English. I live in the 
10 Salt Lake area. I attended the University of Utah and 
11 Westminster College. I graduated. An elementary 
22 teacher, early childhood education. I'm not employed at 
13 the moment. I'm originally from Texas. 
14 \ I'm married. My husband is a paramedic at 
15 Tooele Army Depot. He has a degree in psychology, a 
16 degree in commercial art. He's originally from Ohio. I 
17 think he was born in Kentucky, though. I'm not sure. 
18 I have four grandchildren, six children of my 
19 own, and I raised two foster sons. 
20 I subscribe to Ebony magazine, Field and 
21 Stream. We take the Tribune when we can afford it. A 
22 lot of teacher magazines that I get. I can't remember 
23 all of them. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. English. 
25 Mr. Beckett? 
20 
000152 
was innocent? 
MS. WILSON: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: In the criminal case where the 
defendant was found guilty, do you remember what the 
charges were? 
MS. WILSON: I do not specifically remember. 
It's too long. 
THE COURT: What about the criminal case where 
the jury verdict was not guilty? Do you remember what 
the charges were there? 
MS. WILSON: This was a fraud-type case in that 
instance. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Did I miss 
anyone? Anyone else serve as a juror? Mr. Kapos? 
MR. KAPOS: Fifteen years ago I was dismissed 
on a case because I knew the defendant. 
THE COURT: Anyone else? The record should 
indicate there's no further showing of hands. 
Have any of you — now, when I ask you these 
questions, I don't care about divorce cases, but have any 
of you been a party to any lawsuit, whether it's criminal 
or civil, whether you were a plaintiff or a defendant 
and, if so, please raise your hand. 
Mr. Giles, can you tell us what that was? 
MR. GILES: I have one existing right now, but 
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I was partners in a dry cleaners. 
the people we 
THE 
All 
were renting from. 
COURT: All 
right. Mr. 
right. 
We1re being sued by 
Any other cases? 
Page, did I see your 
assume you have some small claims matters? 
bus 
Ms. 
MR. PAGE: Some 
iness, collections. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
Thompson. 
MS. 
COURT: Any 
PAGE: No. 
COURT: All 
hand? I 
pending right now with the 
other matters? 
right. 
THOMPSON: We have 
stole a machine. The fellow was 
We have quite 
Mr. 
ago 
Mr. 
THE 
Richards? 
MR. 
a few small 
COURT: All 
claims. 
right. 
RICHARDS: I had a 
against an ex-partner 
THE 
Dalton. 
MR. 
COURT: All 
in the 
right. 
Mr. — I'm sorry, 
had one where 
picked up for 
Anyone else? 
someone 
murder. 
case about three years 
business. 
And, let's see, 
DALTON: I had a case about four 
small claims incident. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: All 
HODGSON: I 
right. 
have a 
I know. 
years ago, 
claim on a lien waiver, 
about three years I was in defense of a person that had 
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received a speeding ticket and he wasn't driving. It 
turned out to be his brother. That's about it. 
THE COURT: Anyone else? Ms. English? 
MS. ENGLISH: Well, may I approach the bench? 
THE COURT: You may, along with counsel. 
6 I (Conference off the record.) 
7 THE COURT: Thank you# Ms. English. 
8 Mr. Hodgson? 
9 MR. HODGSON: May I approach? 
10 THE COURT: We'll take a note. If you want to 
11 write a note to me, write it. Let me just tell you, I 
12 don't want a snowball to start. Our effort is to pick a 
13 JurY- I love jurors, but I do need to keep some distance 
14 with you. We need to proceed expeditiously and if we 
15 start getting everybody sending up notes, we may be here 
16 all day and you don't want to do that, do you? 
17 All right. Any of you been witnesses before in 
18 any case other than the case you have already told me 
19 about and other than any divorce cases? If so, raise 
20 your hand. 
21 Dr. Thorell. 
22 DR. THORELL: Expert witness in a lawsuit case. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? The 
24 record should indicate that there's no further showing of 
25 hands . 
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Lake County force. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
KAPOS: 
COURT: 
KAPOS: 
COURT: 
The courthouse bailiffs? 
Yes. 
Who are they? 
They're jail bailiffs. 
What are their names? Are they 
1 close personal friends? 
boy. 
Ms. 
me. 
don' 
MR. 
I can't 
THE 
English? 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
t tell my 
Let 
MR. 
Kenneth Daily, 
THE 
KAPOS: Well, yes, Congas and another Greek 
think of his name. Gambrulos. 
COURT: 
ENGLISH 
COURT: 
ENGLISH 
COURT: 
ENGLISH 
COURT: 
All right. Anyone else? 
: My daughter works for the FBI. 
All right. What does she do? 
: Am I supposed to say it out loud? 
I mean is she an FBI agent? 
: I'm not sure. She didn't tell 
She doesn't tell you? Okay. I 
wife what I do either. 
's see, Mr. Apedaile? 
APEDAILE: I have a really close friend, 
r on the 
COURT: 
golfing buddy? 
MR. 
Salt Lake City police. 
Close friend personally? Great 
APEDAILE: Yes. 
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prosecuted? 
MS, 
J anything. 
THE 
Ms. 
MS. 
windows shot < 
spare tires. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
Mr. Kapos? 
MR. 
LEWIS: 
COURT: 
Freed, 
FREED: 
No. They weren't able to find | 
All right. Thank you. 1 
did I see your hand up? J 
Yes. Same thing, vandalism, J 
and things taken off the cars, parts and 
COURT: 
FREED: 
COURT: 
KAPOS: 
stolen. It was never 
Any prosecutions? J 
No. 
All right. Did I see other hands? 
Ten years ago I had a pickup 
found. And during the past year I 
have had several break-ins in my little business where I 
think they were just 
night. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
ASPER: 
home was broken into, 
it's by professionals 
since then, i 
that's about 
THE 
MS. 
k few of 
it. 
COURT: 
ENGLISH 
looking for a place to sleep at 
Okay. Anyone else? Mr. Asper? 
About seven or eight years ago our 
intended burglary, and I believe 
but they haven't heard anything 
the items were recovered, that 
All right. Ms. English? 
: My son had an electric car stolen 
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from the house, and someone broke into his truck and took 
a jack and CB and stuff like that. We haven1t recovered 
it. 
THE COURT: Has there been any prosecutions? 
MS. ENGLISH: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. English. 
I have indicated to you generally what this 
case is about. It involves charges — again, I'm 
emphasizing the word "charges" — of drug offenses. And 
I want to ask you some questions about that, because 
those types of matters are in the news media a lot, and I 
need to inquire whether or not you have such strong 
feelings about those types of matters that you would be 
unable to try this case in a fair and unbiased manner, 
remembering that Mr. Macial is presumed innocent, 
maintains that presumption, until the State proves, if at 
all, his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
So all I'm trying to probe is whether or not 
you might have such strong feelings concerning controlled 
substances or drugs that you would be unable to proceed 
in the fashion that I have described. If you do have 
such strong feelings, please indicate by raising your 
hand. 
Ms. Thompson? 
MS. THOMPSON: I have an ex-son-in-law who was 
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as a juror. And in this case I don't think that's the 
case. And I think she should serve as a juror and would 
be a very fine juror. And I don't think the challenge is 
sufficient for cause. 
MR. VALDEZ: My challenge isn't on the basis of 
her disability. I agree with you in terms of people that 
are disabled. My concern is her equivocation concerning 
8 the drug issue and the four-year-old child that is the 
9 recently adopted child. 
10\ THE COURT: You know, my equivocation is, in 
11 part, understanding the question, and in her case, when I 
12 asked in open court, it was a little more difficult 
13 because I was further away. And even if she had perfect 
14 hearing, people, you know, wonder, "What in the world is 
15 this judge saying?" 
16 And I think that it's proper, as the Supreme 
17 Court says, that even though they use the term 
18 "rehabilitate," I think that's the wrong term, because if 
19 they need rehabilitation, they shouldn't be on the jury 
20 anyway. But I think it was clarified in her answers that 
21 she would not have such a bias and prejudice. She also 
22 clarified if her — I think, that the child is not going 
23 to interfere with her attention and she promised to set 
24 that aside. So the challenge to Ms. Lewis is overruled. 
25 J The challenge to Mr. Hodgson is sustained on 
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two grounds. One, my reading of the statute indicates 
that the purpose for expungement is to allow people to 
get on with that part of their life that may be — that 
they need to get on with, economically and in such a way 
so their past history does not interfere with that. And 
that is that they do not have to report to the employers 
or in those types of circumstances a conviction or an 
8 J arrest that has been expunged. 
9 The statute on qualifications of jurors appears 
10 to be unequivocal and unconditional on its face. And 
11 that's how you construe it, and that is an expunged 
H felony is still a felony for the purpose of the juror 
13 qualifications statute. 
14 I Additionally, my observation — the reason why 
15 I I was asking questions of Mr. Hodgson is because I was 
16 I watching his demeanor and his facial expressions were 
17 I such that he was going through, in our presence, some 
18 I type of upheaval and reliving the incident that he has 
19 I revealed to us. And that is the plea of guilt he made to 
20 a felony drug charge. And when you combine that with his 
21 statement that, "Well, you folks have never woke up to 
22 the barrel of a .45," and indicating that he would 
23 believe his cousin, without any further statement, is 
24 pregnant with a concept that any other narcotics agent he 
25 would not believe. 
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And I think that his demeanor and his answers 
were such that he is biased and prejudiced against 
narcotics agents, because of his past experience and then 
he could not serve as a juror and be unbiased. So I am 
going to grant that and sustain that challenge for cause. 
6 I Are there any other jurors we need to talk 
7 about? 
8 MR. VALDEZ: I don't think so. That puts us at 
9 I a problem because of the appellate attorney in our 
JO office, if there fs a conviction on this, may look at this 
11 aspect and this issue and may want to use that as an 
12 issue for appeal. 
13 THE COURT: I get reversed all the time. 
14 MR. VALDEZ: Well, with you the problem is that 
15 we told Mr. Hodgson this wouldn't go any further. 
16 THE COURT: I understand. And I need to — 
17 MR. VALDEZ: I don't think it would go any 
18 further than the eyes of the person who responds in the 
19 appellate, and I guess it would be the appellate court in 
20 this matter. But to an extent, that is public and — 
21 THE COURT: Well, let me do this, let me issue 
11 an oral order right now, is that the discussions on the 
23 record are — here with Mr. Hodgson and the note he sent, 
14 are hereby ordered sealed and will be unsealed only upon 
25 order of the Court further on the order of the Court. 
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So what's important is that Gayle understands 
that what will happen, in essence, is that if that is 
necessary, what I'll do is issue an order that it's 
unsealed solely for the purposes of appeal, and no 
reference can be made to the person's name in any 
g I briefing. We'll refer to the person as Juror No. 11. 
7 MR. VALDEZ: That's the best way to do it. 
8 MR. BEHRENS: Perhaps we could bring him back 
9 in and tell him what we're doing, just so he knows we're 
10 not going to mention it? 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 MR. VALDEZ: The other thing, for the record, 
13 if you may, Judge, in order that I can — we'll probably 
14 do it anyway, but I just want to make sure — in order 
15 that no undue attention is brought to the people that 
16 have been challenged for cause and that may be justified 
17 for cause, you ask that we not excuse them until after. 
\8\ THE COURT: I don't do. Some judges do. 
19 (Whereupon, Mr. Hodgson returned to the jury 
20 room.) 
21 THE COURT: The record should indicate that 
22 1 Mr. Hodgson is present. Mr. Hodgson, the reason why we 
23 J brought you back in is to explain to you what has 
24 I happened. 
25 MR. HODGSON: Okay. 
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THE COURT: I have ruled that the law 
prohibiting people who have been convicted of a felony 
from serving as a juror is not changed or amended by the 
expungement statute, which means even though your record 
has been expunged for purposes of serving on the jury, it 
has not been expunged according to my ruling and, 
therefore, you1re disqualified from serving as a juror. 
8 I MR. HODGSON: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: The main reason why we wanted to 
10 talk to you on the record is that the promise I made to 
11 you about keeping this private, this issue, if Mr. Macial 
12I is convicted, there's a good likelihood that my ruling or 
13 rulings may be appealed, which means that they'll need a 
14 transcript of these discussions we have had with you in 
15I order to determine whether or not I excluded a juror that 
16I I should not have. 
17 MR. HODGSON: Okay. 
18 J THE COURT: I have ordered that the transcript 
19 J of our discussions with you and your note be sealed. 
20 MR. HODGSON: Thank you. 
21 J THE COURT: They can be unsealed only upon my 
22I order, if the matter does go on appeal. Then what I'll 
23 J do is order that a transcript can be seen only by the two 
24 lawyers who are handling the appeal and any reference 
25 they make — in any reference they make to this portion 
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of the transcript, they are not to refer to you by name 
but to refer to you as Juror No. 11. So all the 
information will be out, but we1re talking about 
hypothetical Juror No. 11. 
In fact, let me order this to the court 
reporter: That all discusses we have had in this, rather 
than reading "Mr. Hodgson, •• "The Court, •• "Mr. Behrens,11 
and "Mr. Valdez," will read instead, "Mr. Hodgson, Juror 
No. 11." And any reference, any answers to questions 
that Mr. Hodgson gave out in the courtroom, rather than 
referring to him as Juror Hodgson should be referred to 
him as Juror No. 11. 
Is that all right? 
THE REPORTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Then we have a double protection 
that way. 
All right. Furthermore, I did rule in this 
case to the juror disqualification under the statute that 
it appeared to me that — and I donft mean — this is 
more the legal term, not meant to be nasty — that I 
think you would be natural to serve as an unbiased juror 
in this case. 
MR. HODGSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: So there are two reasons that I 
have excluded you from the jury. What we1re going to do 
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MR. VALDEZ: I don't think there's anything we 
have done here that has prejudiced Mr. Macial. We talked 
about specific concerns, these jurors — 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. 
MR. VALDEZ: — and some of their answers. The 
woman I was concerned with because she said she had a 
four-month-old child at home and she was — or wanted to 
make sure that she would be able to listen despite her 
disability, be able to listen and concentrate on the 
testimony. 
She said that she could, and the judge decided 
that she could stay on the potential jury panel. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
MR. VALDEZ: The other individual, he handed us 
a note, and I don't know if you saw the note —• 
THE DEFENDANT: No. To me, anyway, I don't 
know how to read that much, you know. 
MR. VALDEZ: We asked him — 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand a little bit, not 
much, you know. But this is — 
MR. VALDEZ: We asked him some questions, but 
the judge, as the judge, decided he didn't think he could 
be impartial, so he'll be excused, along with a couple of 
other people. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just indicate this, 
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that the note that Mrs. Bettye English wrote reads as 
follows — I don't want this note in the file. She 
doesn't want it in the file. If I read it and put it on 
the record, that's good enough. That's fine. Dated 2-
26-92. Reads: f'I Bettye English, was attempting to sue 
the Board of Education because I was terminated from my 
job through discrimination because I did not have EEO 
involved — " I have to start again. 
All right. The other note from Mr. Hodgson I 
intended to give to the court reporter to keep ~ 
MR. VALDEZ: That's fine. 
THE COURT: — with her notes. 
MR. VALDEZ: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then you can put a caption 
on there in handwriting. 
All right. Do you want to take a short break? 
Mr. Behrens brought one thing to my attention. 
I don't know if she answered that she didn't know anybody 
that was — might have been testifying, but Det. Sampson, 
apparently, indicated to Mr. Behrens that he had gone to 
school with her son, although I don't think that she 
remembered that. 
MR. VALDEZ: Who is the "she"? 
MR. VALDEZ: Ms. English. 
MR. BEHRENS: She didn't even say her son. She 
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said her kid. 
THE COURT: Let's bring her in. With her I 
don't want to do it out there in public. She has this 
thing about ~ 
MR. BEHRENS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Don't you think we ought to make a 
record on it? Do you want to make a record? 
MR. BEHRENS: She stood up and they were asked 
if they knew anybody, and she didn't indicate. The fact 
that he went to school with one of her children — 
THE COURT: There's no reason for any further 
voir dire of her? 
MR. VALDEZ: That's correct. 
MR. BEHRENS: I don't see any reason. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings 
were had in open court:) 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
jury panel is present. Mr. Behrens is present, 
Mr. Valdez is present, Mr. Macial is present. 
I'm sorry that it took us, obviously, a lot 
more time than we expected. Rest assured, we were 
working all the time. We're not fooling around with the 
exceptions noted on the record thus far, do you pass this 
panel for cause? 
74 
000204 
1 MR. BEHRENS: What was the charge? 
2 THE COURT: Armed robbery. 
3 MR. VALDEZ: I had a case with your version to, 
4 but I can't remember. 
5 Judge, you need to put something on the record. 
6 I don't know if I'm required to, but maybe to be safe, I 
7 probably ought to. 
8 I'm going to object to the State fs peremptory 
9 challenge of Ms. English. Ms. English, as the Court will 
10 note, was the only black person in the jury. I think 
U that the only reason that the State may have pre-empted 
12 her is because they may feel and — I'm sorry if I 
13 misrepresent what your feelings are, Mr. Behrens — 
14 Mr. Behrens and I usually get along in the best of times, 
15 but I think that there may be, in his mind, the feeling 
16 1 that simply because she's a member of the minority race, 
17 and in fact she is black, that she might be more 
18 sympathetic to the defendant. 
19 The defendant, the record ought to note, is 
20 Mexican-American or of Hispanic descent. It's a denial 
21 of his due process not to have any minorities on the 
22 jury, whether they be black or Hispanic, and it's a 
23 violation of his due process under the state constitution 
24 and under the federal constitution. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Behrens, could you 
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state for the Court what your reasons for exercising 
peremptory challenges on Ms. English are? 
MR. BEHRENS: I felt, based on her 
unwillingness to speak before the rest of the group about 
a matter that I didn't find — I'm sure she felt that it 
6 J was personal, naturally, but her note indicated she had a 
7 a lawsuit against the school district. I didn't see it 
8 to be something that was so personal that it would be 
9 embarrassing to speak of before the group. 
10 Frankly, I found her, for lack of a better 
11 term, to be somewhat whiny. I don't think she would be a 
12 good juror with the other jurors. And that was the sole 
13 basis. It had nothing to do with her race or anything 
14 else. 
15 THE COURT: All right. You have made the 
16 record. I mean — well, what Mr. Behrens has said to me, 
17 to my mind, justifies, for reasons other than race, his 
IS peremptory challenge. What he has said here corresponded 
19 with my observations of Ms. English's demeanor, and 
20 that's why I ruled that the reasons stated by Mr. Behrens 
21I are not made up, they are not pretentious but, in fact, 
22 I made sense to me. That is the reason he did what he did 
23 J rather than doing it for reasons of race. 
24I MR. VALDEZ: Perhaps I ought to respond to 
25 I that, because my perception of her demeanor was nothing 
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like that. Of course, we all have different 
perspectives. 
THE COURT: It's like beauty; it depends on who 
the beholder is. 
MR. VALDEZ: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And I know# obviously, there can be 
differences of opinion. That's why some people would 
strike some jurors and some would not. But Ifm 
satisfied. 
We'll see you at 1:30. 
MR. BEHRENS: Yes. 
MR. VALDEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Luncheon recess, 12:10 p.m.) 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
jury is now present. 
Is 
statement? 
exclude 
invoked 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
counsel read to proceed with opening 
BEHRENS: 
COURT: 
BEHRENS: 
VALDEZ: 
the witnesses. 
THE 
what 
COURT: 
We are, your Honor. 
Mr. Behrens. 
Thank 
Judge, 
Members 
you, your Honor. 
it would be my motion 
of the jury, Mr. 
is called the exclusionary rule. 
to 
Valdez has 
That rule, 
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THE COURT: That's what I mean, now. Then come 
back and go straight through with jury instructions. 
MR. VALDEZ: That's fine. 
MR- BEHRENS: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, 
we're going to take a recess from ten to fifteen minutes. 
I'll try to keep it as close to ten as possible. 
Remember the admonition. We'll see you as 
quickly as we can. No shorter than ten nor, hopefully, 
longer than fifteen minutes. 
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
jury has exited. 
Do you want to go ahead and make your motion? 
MR. VALDEZ: Well, my motion was going to be 
for a directed verdict. I don't think that the State has 
provided sufficient evidence in order to give it to the 
jury. One witness is a gentleman, I guess, who we're 
going to believe. I need to make it for the record. 
THE COURT: You do. And it's a question of who 
they are going to believe and, therefore, reasonable 
minds could differ. 
MR. VALDEZ: I should probably also renew my 
motion for a mistrial. And the basis is that the jury 
selection process in this case, in that a juror was not 
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1 included who I consider to have probably been more of a 
2 I peer to Mr. Macial than anybody else without, I think, 
3 I sufficient ground or reason. 
4 THE COURT: What juror are you talking about? 
5 MR. VALDEZ: Mrs. English. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Your motion is noted. 
7 I Motion for a new trial is denied. 
8 I Have you had an opportunity to look at those 
9 instructions? 
10 MR. VALDEZ: I have gone through them. I don't 
11 think there's anything there that I have a problem with. 
12 MR. BEHRENS: I only got as far as the long 
13 instruction. We won't need No. 13. That's the expert 
14 witness instruction. 
15 THE COURT: You're right. What I'll do is just 
16 tell them we jump from 12 to 14. So, Gene, would you 
17 remove Exhibit 13 from all their sets and I'll just tell 
18 them, "Don't pay any attention to the fact that we have 
19 I skipped a number, but we just don't have a 13." 
20 If you want to go ahead and take a few minutes 
21 and look at those, I'll stand here and stare at you. 
22 I It's like watching somebody eating. 
23 All right. We'll start in ten minutes, then 
24 J we'll do jury instructions. 
25 MR. BEHRENS: Actually, I like your last ones 
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